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q 201A disregard for human traditions, the brutality of predation, sacriﬁce, and sexual desire are ingrained in languages
across cultures. This paper concerns a key linguistic feature reﬂecting this predicament: utterances that encapsulate
their opposite and effectuate a U-turn in meaning. This mode of communication stands out as a representation of
the friction between incommensurable worlds—conceived together. An enemy’s perspective or an unpalatable reality
ﬁnds a host within language. I embark upon a multidisciplinary search for examples of such utterances and present an
assemblage of ﬁve pertinent images. Each of these makes a distinct conceptual contribution. Vigilance and an aware-
ness of other points of view underpinmost of the utterances under study, which I propose to call “sharp communication”
at the intersection of opposing perspectives.In life, Ashe was afﬂicted with unreality, as so many English-
men are; in death he is not even the ghost he was in life. (Borges
1944:10)
In London, in a home provided by the housing authority,
Lorîn narrates an encounter that took place over a decade
ago in Turkey. This story, told in Kurdish, is fast paced and
exhaustive, and it documents her former husband’s experi-
ence. He let Lorîn know that he met his torturer—a police-
man—in person, unexpectedly. He had taken the stairs to the
tenth ﬂoor of a high-rise building to redecorate a ﬂat. That
is where he met the man, who had subjected him to the kinds
of sexual torture that had made any future form of family life
impossible. Lorîn enunciates a minute-by-minute account, re-
porting the speech and gestures of both men. Her ex-husband
told her, “His color changed. I gave him my hand. I said ‘hello’
[to the torturer], the man’s hand was trembling in my hand.
Alone, they are always like that, when they are together they
are like wolves, when they are left alone they get frightened.”
The two men engaged in a conversation. The handshake and
the image of one hand trembling in the other conjure opposing
worlds: a reassertion of humanity through ritualized gesture,
while being horrifying at the same time. Like animals, wolves-
when-together, they become humans when singled out: “I gave
him my hand.”
In this paper, I explore the antithetical worlds encapsulated
in this moment. I engage in a cross-disciplinary search for the
linguistic counterparts to this kind of gesture. I mobilize the
term antipodal to refer to the simultaneity of opposing worlds.Pillen teaches linguistic anthropology in the Department of
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aThe term is derived from the Latin antipodes, or “those who
dwell on the opposite side of the earth,” and from the Greek
antipodes, “with feet opposite (ours).” Or, in John Trevisa’s
translation of Bartholomew the Englishman’s De Proprietati-
bus Rerum from 1397, “the antipodes, men that haue theyr fete
ayenst our fete” (Bartholomeus 1535 [1240]:xv). This study of
antipodal expressions emerges from anthropological work on
dehumanization and the reassertion of humanity in contexts of
extreme violence and civil war. The interface or shared bound-
ary of the human and inhuman thereby becomes a point of
departure to question words that contain their opposite and
embody a U-turn in meaning: antipodal utterances.
First Image
The Dictionaries of the Wolf–the Tiger–the Jaguar
Anthropological debates on the intertwining worlds of humans
and animals appear like an apposite point of departure to begin
to deﬁne antipodal utterances. Relevant seminal texts mostly
appeared in the 1980s and were based on research in Papua
New Guinea, Central America, Malaysia, and Amazonia (Des-
cola 1986; Howell 1984; Rappaport 1968; Schieffelin 1987;
Severi 1982; Viveiros de Castro 1986; Wagner 1977).1 Further
publications by the same authors as well as recent discussions
were devoted to the study of ontological categories, such as
“humanity” or “animality” (e.g., Kohn 2013). What used to be
the philosophical study of the nature of existence and the dif-1. Such key texts are to be contextualized within a wider array of eth-
nographic commentaries on comparable cosmologies in South America
(Vaupes area, the Wari, the Juruna, Campa, Matsiguenga, Wayapi, U’wa,
Akuriyo), Siberia, Asia (Chewong, Ma’Betisek), and native North America
(Eskimo, Cree, Ojibwa, Koyukon, Kaska, Tsimshian, Haida; see Viveiros de
Castro 1998b:471, 484).
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nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
2. The terms of this debate ﬁt within the wider context of the study of
indexicality, deixis, and shifters. “Indexicality” concerns meaning that
depends on the context of the utterance. It is often used interchangeably
with “deixis,” which in the past was speciﬁcally associated with spatio-
temporal references (e.g., “here” or “now”). “Shifter” is another word for
indexical signs whose reference “shifts” regularly, depending on the fac-
tors of the speech situation. The referential value of a shifter therefore
depends on an actual speech event (Hanks 2001; Silverstein 1976:24–25).
3. Taylor links the uncertainty, ignorance, and hesitation of Achuar
peoples when faced with questions by anthropologists to this linguistic
conundrum—the “substantiﬁcation” induced by ethnographic (nominal)
representation and translation (1993:444–445). In later work, Viveiros de
Castro explores the limitations of our grammatical categories. Named
artifacts are objects that necessarily point to a subject (naming them).
Substances named by substantives like “manioc beer” are somehow used as
if they are relational pointers, “something halfway between” a noun and a
pronoun, a substantive and a deictic (2004: 471–472, 476).
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of ethnographic practice. This opened the door to a consid-
eration of the differing ontologies of contemporary hunter-
gatherers: the deﬁnition of entities that exist or can be said to
exist, and how they can be grouped as humans, animals or
spirits. I propose to consider the linguistic dimensions and im-
plications of such scholarship as a heuristic device to project a
ﬁrst image of antipodal utterances.
The anthropological literature includes valuable data on
language practices in societies that do not feature modern dis-
tinctions between humanity and animality. Among the Kuna
of Panama, humans and animals (although physically differ-
ent) share a cultural prowess, such as the development of mar-
riage customs and languages. Humanity does not occupy a
privileged position in the world because of the existence of
“language,” as it does among us. The Kuna shaman is, however,
the only human who knows the languages of animals, such as
the call of the jaguar, and understands his speech (Severi 1982:
44, 55). Likewise, in the tropical forest of the Malay peninsula,
Chewong society stretches far beyond the ontological frontiers
of “humanity” and includes spirits, plants, and animals, all with
a reﬂexive consciousness, whether they be human or nonhu-
man. Each consciousness has a characteristic mode of vision, a
different way of perceiving reality, portrayed by Howell as a
“relativity of perception.” Some spirits feed on the conscious-
ness of humans and animals but perceive this asmeat. Likewise,
in the eyes of a tiger, humans are nothing more than potential
meat, just as monkeys are to humans. There is a uniquely hu-
man way of seeing the world, but there is also a tiger’s manner
of seeing the world (Howell 1984:104–105, 156, 160–164). This
is not an exceptional ontology found in Southeast Asia, and the
same kind of “perceptive realism” can be found in Amazonia
and Papua New Guinea. Multiple worlds coexist within the
same environment, inhabited by classes of beings that perceive
their fellows as humans but regard the inhabitants of other
worlds as animals or spirits (Descola 2013:24). I set out to ad-
dress how such ontologies are reﬂected linguistically.
With respect to Amazonian cosmologies, this carousel of
perceptions has been labeled “perspectivism” (Lima 1996; Vi-
veiros de Castro 1996). Among the Araweté, a Tupi-Guarani
people of Brazil, animals and spirits see themselves as humans,
and animals (as predators) see humans as animals (prey). Such
Amerindian perspectivism has an essential relationship with a
hunting ideology, and many of the examples given in Viveiros
de Castro’s work pertain to the semantic ﬁeld of predator-prey
relationships. The dictionary of the jaguar also contains the
concept of manioc beer, and it has the same signiﬁcation as in a
human dictionary—a tasty and nutritious liquid that makes
you drunk—but jaguars use it to refer to what we call “blood”
(Viveiros de Castro 1998a:18, 22, 1998b:470). This is an im-
age of a sign or words—manioc beer—that emerges from the
study of Amerindian perspectivist cosmology. Viveiros deCastro
states such ﬁndings call for a theory of the sign rather than
a psychological study of animism or the attribution of a soul to
a wider category of beings (1996:126, 1998b:476; see also TaylorThis content downloaded from 081.096.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a1993:444–445). I propose to deﬁne “manioc beer” as an an-
tipodal utterance: a tasty liquid that may refer to the death of
prey, including human prey, or blood. This example speaks to
realities of dehumanization where the blood or suffering of a
human being can be something pleasurable.
What is more, Viveiros de Castro argues that Amerindian
words, which we usually translate as “human being,” function
as pronouns rather than nouns (e.g., us and them). They are
not self-sufﬁcient substantives but depend on a point of view.
The fact that they were congealed into a noun, or “name of a
tribe,” appears as an artefact of the colonial encounter. The
terms that refer to peoples denote human beings if uttered
by humans, but if monkeys or beavers use them, they refer to
monkeys or beavers (Viveiros de Castro 1996:125–126, 132,
1998b:476). Benveniste highlighted how pronouns such as “I,”
“you,” “us,” and “them” depend on the position and per-
spective of the person who utters them. This is a typical at-
tribute of indexical signs or shifters.2 Each has its own refer-
ence, and this depends on the context of their use. Note that
this is very different from a “nominal sign,” deﬁned by the
object it refers to (e.g., a “baton”). There is no real object de-
ﬁnable as “I” or “that.” Such words lack material reference
points. They have no value or do not exist, except in the in-
stance of being spoken. Their meaning or referents depend on
the moment they are uttered. Benveniste deﬁnes such words as
an ensemble of empty or mobile signs that are nonreferential
with respect to reality but can be ﬁlled in by a speaker. Pro-
nouns are therefore words of an entirely different nature and
escape the status of other signs of language. Language puts
forth empty forms that each speaker can appropriate as relat-
ing to his person (Benveniste 1971:218–220, 226, 227). Viveiros
de Castro argues that, among the Araweté, a wider category of
words can function as pronouns, at least compared with Indo-
European languages. The same pronominal principle applies
to words that we translate as “human being” but also to words
for bodily attributes or food—“manioc beer.”3When uttered by
a human or a jaguar, a man or his predator, they stand for very56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
4. Pāninị described a bhāsạ̄, a spoken language as well as the religious
language of Vedic India (Renou 1941:106–107).
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representation (Viveiros de Castro 1996:127–128).
Lima’s analysis of Juruna perspectivism evokes its linguis-
tic facet eloquently. The word is “nothing but anticipation.”
In the life of the hunter, not even the word is representation.
The hunt can be seen as two simultaneous events: one event
from the point of view of the human and another from the
wild boar’s perspective. They reﬂect each other. The word is
a performance, intended to move from one perspective to
the other—during the simultaneous events of the hunt—cir-
culating among all perspectives and stopping nowhere. The
word is hunting, anticipating, or tracing its double (Lima 1996:
35, 41).
As suggested by a reviewer, Bachnik’s work on “situated
meaning” is useful here. The argument above is affected by a
tension between terms derived from Indo-European gram-
mar (Benveniste 1971) and an Amerindian language from
an entirely different family. Bachnik’s linguistic anthropology
of Japanese accentuates the preconceptions ingrained in the
grammar of European languages. Personal pronouns, such as
“I,” “you,” and “she” are imbued with the ancient Greek no-
tion of dramatic character or theatrical role (via the Latin per
sonae, meaning that through which the sound comes, or mask;
Bachnik 1982:3). The use of the term person or personal pro-
noun by grammarians is therefore related to their metaphor-
ical conception of a language-event as a drama in which the
principal role is played by the ﬁrst person, the subsidiary role
by the second person, and other roles by the third person
(Lyons 1977:638, quoted in Bachnik 1982). In Japanese, the
situationally located relationships between speaker, hearer,
and their scene displace the notion of language as a classical
dramatic event. Situated meaning is not “about” an external
world. The organization of the Japanese language around sit-
uated meanings is at odds with the notion of an external
nonlinguistic world reﬂected in referential language (Bachnik
1994:23; Brenneis 1994:x). It is as if a language-event conceived
as drama engenders wider viewpoints beyond the immediate
situation or an external world to be venerated via referential
language use. By contrast, Bachnik notes that “Most linguists
agree that no class of pronouns exists in Japanese, and that
names, age-status terms, kin terms, place-names, and zero terms
are all used where pronouns would be used in Indo-European
languages” (1986:56). Moreover, the situated meanings of Jap-
anese words that we do not intuitively classify as pronouns
accentuate the conceptual conundra that also affect the mate-
rial on Amerindian languages quoted above.
Another central example can be found in the work of Erik-
son or his analysis of the word nawa among the Amazonian
tribes that make up the Pano linguistic group. Nawa is a ge-
neric term for stranger, but it also features in names used by
people to refer to themselves. It designates both that to which
one is opposed and that with which one identiﬁes. Erikson
deﬁnes nawa as a kind of reservoir of brute force that needs
to be socialized, but it is also deﬁned as a model or even the
guarantee for the virtues that constitute society. He highlightsThis content downloaded from 081.096.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms athe remarkable ambivalence of the concept nawa. Alterity,
even radical alterity, is perceived in a paradoxical manner:
as being consubstantial with the self (1996:78–81). Descola
quotes Erikson’s work and remarks: “It is here that the theme
of perspectivism developed by Viveiros de Castro acquires its
full meaning.” The antipodal word nawa can therefore be
found in societies that are not perspectivist in the narrow
sense of the word, where it is not claimed that animals, who see
themselves as humans, apprehend humans as nonhumans.
This concerns a wider category of societies, deﬁned by Descola
as seeing oneself through the eyes of another—through the
eyes of external observers, other tribes, other species, or the
dead. A point of view, different from their own, becomes in-
dispensable to situate themselves in their own collective (Des-
cola 2013:255–256). This analysis highlights the wider rele-
vance of Viveiros de Castro’s call for a theory of the sign,
beyond the study of a smallish number of societies that are
deﬁned as perspectivist in anthropological parlance (Viveiros
de Castro 1998b).
A cross-examination of the substantive in our translation of
Amerindian languages and Benveniste’s notion of the empty
sign are leading tropes for the study of the antipodal utterance.
For the time being, the space that will never be ﬁlled, or the
paper’s title, denotes this kind of emptiness. The ﬁeld note I
cited in the introduction, about a man and his torturer, leads
me to juxtapose the notion of the wolf to the well-known
examples of tiger and jaguar and to extend this discussion to a
wider category of dehumanized humans and enemies in op-
posing contexts. To complement this image of antipodal ut-
terances depicted so far, I now turn to an Indo-European
world, or historical and linguistic material on chronic warfare
and conquest in ancient India.
Second Image
The Gap between the Beginning of a Step and Its Completion
Modern translation and the language we use to discuss lin-
guistic practice globally—our metalanguage—might not be
sufﬁcient. I now consider the metalanguage of the Sanskrit
scholar Pāninị as a second heuristic device to study antipodal
utterances. His grammar is one of the earliest known works
in descriptive linguistics, from the fourth century BC.4 Renou
explains how the vocabulary of that era included twin for-
mula or positive and negative phrases that were mentioned
together and eventually consisted of one expression. Such con-
trasting formulas occurred with a remarkable frequency. There
was an excess of words with a double meaning in the Sanskrit
literature, as words moved from one pole of the semantic scale
to the other via intermediary meanings. However, Renou high-
lights instances of “radical semantic rupture” and argues that
“banal euphemisms” are to be distinguished from words that56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
6. Detienne’s work on ancient Greece gives a detailed image of the cog-
000 Current Anthropology Volume 58, Number 6, December 2017effectuate a U-turn in meaning. He offers a critique to col-
leagues who are prone to explain such contradiction with ref-
erence to the notion of euphemism. Verbs referring to violence
had a natural ambivalence, as one verb could have both a vi-
olent meaning and its opposite (see table 1). The same words
were often used to refer to both allies and enemies. Renou
translates the Sanskrit yaksạ́ as both prodigy and misdeed and
warns us against the inexact modern translation “demon” (Re-
nou 1939:163, 167, 174, 176–177, 187, 195, 205). These are
Sanskrit words that I propose to call antipodal.
Malamoud’s work on ancient India points in a similar di-
rection. Vedic thought accentuated the signiﬁcance of the dif-
ference existing between superimposed meanings. An enig-
matic word might draw its strength from the tension of the
question to which it gives rise or the space opened up by this
question. This constituted a suspended betweenness or a space
that will never be ﬁlled (Malamoud 1996:206).5 As the title
of this paper suggests, I propose to retain this as a key phrase
for this study of the antipodal utterance. It is a space seldom
inhabited by the modern scholar, and I deploy it as a critical
vantage point for a probe into each of the ﬁve selected images.
An indispensable point in Renou’s study is that ambiguity
does not essentially occur at the level of the word but exists as
a more fundamental ambiguity. Within Vedic thought, things
in the world or the referents themselves can be ambiguous.
Renou’s detailed analysis of ambivalence in the names of
weapons, enemies, allies, and populations leads to an under-
standing of the political circumstances surrounding the culti-
vation of such an ambiguous vocabulary (Renou 1939:203–
216). The superposition of two contrasting values within one
term exists not only at a linguistic level but within the acts
themselves. Given the volatile political context of Vedic India,
uncertainty and ﬂux were sedimented into language. The in-
determinacy engendered in the phenomenon of switching sides
manifests itself within language—a man of the clan or a man
who now belongs to the enemy. Renou thus stresses there is a
reversibility of the acts as well as of the formulas describing them.
Such expressions are radical in the sense that they recog-
nize the presence of different perspectives—”reconnaissance
d’une contre-partie,” in Renou’s words. Renou stresses that the
sociopolitical conditions of the Vedic era explain the impor-
tance of such linguistic couples. This is conceptualized as a
reciprocity or equilibrium in the use of weapons and violence
as well as speech by the two opposed parties. In other words,
meaning emanates from a particular perspective and position
within the political context, but such positions can rapidly shift5. This is an image readily depicted by a Japanese term for which there
is no English equivalent. Ma, or “negative space,” denotes a gap, a space
between two structural parts, the void between objects, an interval—a
simultaneous awareness of form and nonform. Hladik translates it as
espacement in French. She also pays attention to words such as ko-rai (the
past-future), sho-ji (birth-death), or shometsu (birth-disappearance): lin-
guistic couples that are inseparable, where opposites meet (Hladik 2008:
177–178, 221).
This content downloaded from 081.096.1
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value of actions and moves. An ambiguous vocabulary is the
linguistic counterpart of a worldview inwhich it is not somuch
the values of words that are reversible but the value of the
actions they describe, actions that are likely to occur simulta-
neously within the worlds of opposing camps (Renou 1939:
212, 222, 229–230, 232). This is equally important in Vidal-
Naquet’s work concerning ancient Greece. The ambivalence
of efﬁcacious speech in the most ancient works of Greek
thought was preceded in the classical city by an ambiguity of
action, or the permanent risk involved in every collective de-
cision. One’s acts might become something different due to the
indeterminacy of collective action. A simple land clearance
might actually be a full colonial expedition—peace orwar (1996:
11).6 Here the referent itself is unpredictable and therefore
ambiguous.
Our modern experience of such linguistic realities appears
governed by notions of the enigmatic, the contradictory, or
even the mysterious. The metalanguage of the Sanskrit scholar
Pāninị enables us to depict a more focussed image of such
words. Renou’s analysis of Pāninị’s grammar considers the
status of the noun or substantive in ancient India. A ﬁrst
question, of course, is how Sanskrit scholars conceived of the
notion of the “word” itself. Renou locates the origin of Pāninị’s
grammar in Vedic ritual, as many key grammatical terms were
borrowed from ritual language. The grammatical term “word”
was derived from the ritualists’ concept of “step.”Renou points
out that the hasty transcription of Sanskrit grammar “into
modern” by nineteenth-century scholars makes us loose sight
of the ritual philosophy inherent within Sanskrit grammar.7
The concordance between the linguistic habits of ritual and
grammatical theory reveals that both disciplines emerged in
the same milieu and responded to complementary sociopo-
litical needs (Renou 1941:134–137, 144, 152, 160). The image
Pāninị’s “word” conjures appears to acknowledge an inter-
mediate zone, or the indeterminacy between the beginning of
a step and its completion. The image of a footstep appears
complemented by a modern description of “a suspended be-
tweenness” or space that will never be ﬁlled (as in Malamoud
1996).
Renou’s seminal work opens up the possibility for a further
consideration of sacriﬁcial ideology to question antipodal
linguistic form. Not only was the notion of the “word” initiallynitive processes whereby ambiguity was replaced by a differing mode of
thought favoring noncontradiction. He questions whatmental structures link
a logic of ambiguity and a logic of noncontradiction and argues that ambi-
guity—in the sense of an intermediate zone between antithetical terms—has
not been totally expunged (Detienne 1996:17, 86, 106, 125, 127).
7. See Hastings’s “From Ritual to Grammar” for a further discussion of
Vedic literature, the structure of ritual manuals, as well as metalinguistic
devices in Sanskrit grammar (Hastings 2003). Also see Robbins for a con-
sideration of the link between conceptions of language and ritual and the
relationship between linguistic and ritual ideologies (Robbins 2001:598).
56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
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8. Such sacriﬁcial practices are embedded within a wider cultural con-
text of cultivation of ambiguity and encompassment of opposing elements.
Kapferer highlights the ambiguous and unstable character of deities and
demons within the Sinhala Buddhist pantheon, as forces of relative purity
and fortune are inextricably linked with the forces of pollution and death
(Kapferer 1983:163–164).
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ﬁcial substance (dravya) acquired the meaning of “substan-
tive” in Pāninị’s grammar. The attraction of meaning from a
preceding enunciation was also encoded in grammar (e.g., as
anukarsạnạ in the work of Sanskrit grammarians Kātyāyana
and Patañjali). Within the commentaries on Vedic ritual, this
is ordinarily expressed as ākarsạnạ (Renou 1941:125, 140).
Here I am compelled to refer to the Sanskrit term’s contem-
porary use by ritualists in Sri Lanka. Note the modern inter-
pretation of ākarsạnạ, as Obeyesekere translates this term as
“magnetism” (1984:108). During sacriﬁcial rituals, illness or
moral faults are transferred from the patient into a sacriﬁcial
object in an act of cleansing (Argenti-Pillen 2007:119–122,
2010:119). The term ākarsạnạ denotes the effect of circular
gestures. They attract faulty moral substance or illness and
transfer it from the afﬂicted person into the sacriﬁcial sub-
stance. The sacriﬁcial object thereby contains or encompassesThis content downloaded from 081.096.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms athe cause of illness and disorder. It is subsequently offered to
the offending spirits, who are tricked into consuming and
containing the illness they caused. Agents of illness consume
the faultymoral substance and thus attest to their reversibility.8
The grammar of a sacriﬁcial gesture (or ākarsạnạ) and the rit-
ual steps taken to constitute the sacriﬁcial substance give an
indication of its antipodal character, simultaneously embody-
ing disease and constituting its remedy. Much like an utterance
can attract meaning from a preceding utterance, ritual gestures
attract moral substance into a sacriﬁcial object. Renou’s ma-Table 1. Elements revealing a fundamental ambiguity or slippage in meaning within the vocabulary of the Rigveda, giving
abbreviated descriptions of semantic ﬁelds followed by a column with direct quotes or supporting data from Renou’s oeuvreFavorable semantic zone Unfavorable semantic zone56.128 on November 0
nd Conditions (http://wRenou (1939)avrj̣- To overthrow the malicious
ones, to divert maleﬁcent
beingsCurve, sin, wrongdoing La racine vrj̣- possède une double valeur très
accusée. D’une part c’est ‘renverser’ les
méchants. (cf. la spécialization péjorative prise
par vrj̣iná- ‘courbe, faux’ et même ‘péché’
en class., ‘détresse’ Bhāg. Pur., comme ámḥas-
támas- bhādá-). D’autre part ‘attirer à soi (la
divinité).’ Si l’on fait entrer en compte l’usage
des Br. Ge. VSt. I p. 1 5 2 et notamment
l’expression pāpmānam ̣ vrj̣- ‘détourner le mal’,
la rupture sémantique est à son plus haut
point (176).saścire and saścima Us the pious ones who
escape themThe man who was conquered by the
empire of the malicious ones and
has left our communityÁpa saścire V 20 2 se dit de l’homme qui tombe
sous l’empire des méchants, qui quitte la
communauté: mais la variante ápa . . . saścima
au même passage dans le YV. utilize une
acception inversée ‘nous (les pieux) qui leur
échappons’ (O.): on voit avec quelle facilité
une même combinaison linguistique se prête
à fonctionner dans les directions opposées
(171–172).jána- and jánya- The men of the clan Strangers, belonging to the enemy,
a foreign countryjána- désigne les hommes du clan (auquel
appartient celui qui parle); au contraire le
dérivé jánya- signiﬁe ‘étranger’ dans jányād
ámḥasah ̣ IV 55 5 opposé à mitríyāt, sans
doute aussi IX 49 2. Plus nettement jánya-
X 42 6, épithéte de dyumná, est ‘qui appartient
à l’ennemi’. . . . Quant au mot jána- lui-même,
le sens correspondant ‘pays étranger’ n’y est
pas inconnu: PB. VI 10 12 XVI 6 8 Caland SḄ,
p. 197 Eelsingh (et cf. Caland Ai Zauberei
p.6 n. 36) Saundar. XV 31 et skt boudhh en
general (207–208).a Please note the date of publication of this text by Renou, which I mobilize in dialogue with later work by Malamoud (1996). Since 1939, there have
been major developments, not least the ﬁrst complete English translation of the Rigveda in over a century, by former students of Stanley Insler (Jamison
and Brereton 2014). Insler comments on Renou’s article from 1939: Renou “overlooked that the RigVeda, although a text in praise of good gods and their
abilities, also has to mention the bad gods and their followers. Since there were no separate vocabularies for these opposing sides, the same terminology
had to come into play from time to time.” Regarding one of the entries in table 1, Insler comments “there is no other way to express the sentiment” and
notes that other old Indo-European languages have distinct vocabularies for such purposes. Avestan, the closest sister language to Sanskrit, has a
completely different vocabulary when speaking of the followers of truth and the followers of deceit (S. Insler, personal communication).7, 2017 02:07:14 AM
ww.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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stantive” in ancient India (1941) as well as the notion of ākar-
sạnạ in recent ethnographic work point at the relevance of the
study of ritual for the study of the antipodal utterance and
“substantive.”The ethnographic study of sacriﬁcial ritual forms
the basis for the next image of the antipodal utterance.
Third Image
Sacriﬁcial Substance–the Substantive–Simultaneity
Anthropological scholarship on sacriﬁce and divination allows
me to superimpose a third image and analytical milestone.
Devisch, in a monograph on Yaka culture in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, provides a fundamental example when he
addresses the ambiguity of the term fula. This word refers to
the root cause of afﬂiction—a condemned misdeed or theft
within the community, but also the foam and sediment that
emerges during the fermentation of palm wine, the erotic at-
traction between partners, and ﬁnally the appeal or attrac-
tion between healer and patient (Devisch 1993:11, 230, 268;
R. Devisch, personal communication). As such, the word fula
completes a U-turn in meaning. A similar dynamic governs
the blood sacriﬁce of the hen. The healer coils a hen in a spiral
around the patient’s body and thereby transfers the patient’s
illness to the sacriﬁcial bird, before it is consumed by members
of the group. As both substance of afﬂiction and force of
healing, the sacriﬁcial hen ﬁts within a wider Yaka cosmology
in which ill fortune and disease can be induced to destroy itself.
The process of healing in Yaka culture is thus understood as
an ability to simultaneously embody and enact strongly con-
ﬂictual affects and contrasting states of life. Ritual corporeal
devices engender the simultaneous deployment of one con-
notation and its reverse in a conceptual realm where sepa-
rateness and interdependence, autonomy and mutuality exist
simultaneously.9 Devisch depicts such ritual reversals as real-
ities not yet appropriated by a hero, an author, or the lead-
ership of a narrative voice (Devisch 1993:212, 236–237, 242,
253–254, 266, 269)—in my analysis, a reality not yet appro-
priated by a perspective.
Renou attributes antipodal structures of meaning in an-
cient India to the indeterminate sociopolitical circumstances
of Vedic society (Renou 1939). Devisch, however, relates the
basic ability to embody paradox, bipolar unity, oneness, and
duplication to everyday experiences of life transmission: the
solidarity between life giving and death and the risk of death
in child birth. The ambiguity and risk of life transmission ﬁts
within a wider category of double-bind experiences, as people
are trapped between the contradictory constraints of ﬁdelity
to tradition and the concrete demands of survival. In the eth-
nography by Devisch, “Janusian” refers to the ability to con-
ceive and use multiple antithetical or opposite thoughts simul-9. Different from the nonparadoxical logic of distinct “binary oppo-
sitions” (Devisch 1993:276).
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A bridge between polar opposites reﬂects a Janusian world and
thought movement where strongly conﬂictual affects are si-
multaneously embodied (Devisch 1993:266, 269–270, 274–275,
277). This study attests to the value of an analysis of sacriﬁcial
ideology and double-sided realities in healing rites for a more
general consideration of antipodal forms of expression.
Antipodal utterances reveal a culture-speciﬁc pattern of
meaning—as opposed meanings may be encompassed by a
single word. The Bakhtinian notion of “shared territory,” de-
veloped by Brenneis, leads to the image of the word as locality
with a culture-speciﬁc conﬁguration and boundary of meaning
(Brenneis 1986:339). This allows for an exploration of spatial
images of the word: the word as a space within which signi-
ﬁcation articulates itself. Antipodal words are characterized
by a tension between opposing meanings, a “grammar” inter-
nal to the word or inner tension, which is not reducible to
the notion of polysemy. Inhabiting this space involves a sen-
sibility to an enigmatic affective state, in which emotions are
suspended between opposing poles. A Bakhtinian dialogism
(cf. Kristeva 1980:74) inherent in the word takes into account
an orientation toward the other, the interlocutor. The literary
word is seen as “an intersection of textual surfaces rather than
a point” (Kristeva 1980:65, emphasis in the original). This
imagery, however, is based on a subjectivism of authorship and
interlocutorship. Note that Bachnik’s analysis of Japanese dis-
course points at the cultural limits of an Indo-European pro-
nominal paradigm or “shifting” between the perspectives of
speaker and addressee—the pronominal “I” and “you” as focal
poles of interaction and dichotomy of self and other (Bachnik
1982:15, 23–24, 1986:56, 68). I postulate that dialogism and
the sharing of territories of meaning are different from inhab-
iting the tension between opposing meaning in a preauthorial
(Devisch 1993), anticipatory (Lima 1996), or perspectival (Vi-
veiros de Castro 1996) sense.
Antipodal words challenge the taken-for-granted margins
of semantic networks or include points of semantic rupture. By
taking into accountMary Douglas’s approach (1966:122–125),
the boundaries of the word as territory can be interpretatively
linked to other spatial idioms—in this instance, sacriﬁce and
sacriﬁcial substance. The topography of the word, or texture
of meaning, may include its opposite. The image of encom-
passment of opposites I depicted in this section depends on
examples of sacriﬁcial substances as well as “substantives,”
such as the word fula in the work of Devisch. As a container
of opposing meaning, a center of an antipodal word is difﬁcult
to deﬁne. Opposing meanings do not coagulate to make a sta-
ble core. The image of an outer shell, emptiness, or a tension of
meaning emerges, characterizing the semantic topography of
the antipodal utterance: a space that will never be ﬁlled.
This third image of the antipodal word depicted so far de-
pends on a simultaneity of opposites. The notion of simulta-
neity merits further attention. Parkin’s analysis of the speech
of Arab, Swahili, and Giriama diviners of Kenya addresses
“cognitive simultaneity”: speaking and thinking of different56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
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This concerns the thought process, reversal, and contradictory
simultaneity in the speech of a diviner. Conﬂicting innuendos
are created, so that diviners can retreat from an unpromising
lead and take up another through the use of the same words.
Parkin quotes a diviner addressing a client: “But the wife can’t
or won’t get out of your body . . . and she can say I don’t love
you and she can leave you.” It is noteworthy that the wife is
locked inside the victim’s body, possessing or consuming it, yet
she is also leaving it. Parkin concludes that this logic of si-
multaneity achieves a shocking and brilliant poignancy that
conventional sentences rarely attain. This logic operates at a
level closer to the orderless networks of deep-structure se-
mantics and aesthetic of ritual and is to be distinguished from
the sequentiality of other forms of language. This analysis of the
logic of simultaneity in divination, as including contradiction
and some reversals, includes references to what I would call
antipodal sensibilities (1982:71, 74, 78, 82–83).10 Parkin’s jux-
taposition of the conventional versus the brilliantly poignant
and the simultaneity of opposites in Giriama divination high-
light the relevance of an anthropology of religious practice for
the study of nonsequential dimensions of language.
Quintessential topics of anthropology—sacriﬁce and divi-
nation—offer a tool to question the analytical preponderance
of pronominal forms of representation: the relative value of a
pronominal paradigm and its sequential habits. First, Renou’s
ﬁndings resist analysis in these terms. He highlights the per-
spectival quality of certain Sanskrit words but encounters a
ﬁrm ground in Pāninị’s grammar. The notion of dravya or
sacriﬁcial substance is adopted by Sanskrit scholars to mean
“substantive” or noun. In this paper’s succession of images, a
consideration of nouns that may be functioning as pronouns
gives way to a study of the antipodal noun itself. Seminal work
by Parkin (1982) and Devisch (1993) addresses the simul-
taneity of opposites within an anthropology of sacriﬁce and
its vocabulary, divination, and the aesthetic of ritual. As this
paper’s subtitle indicates, a simultaneity of opposites is a de-
ﬁning element of sharp communication piercing through a se-
quential logic of representation. This third image leads me to
direct my attention to the history of English literary aesthetics
in a fourth and penultimate image.
Fourth Image
The Blank Cheque of Paradox
One might argue that the contradiction merely supplies the
tension, and does not decide the note on which the string will
vibrate. (Empson 1951:12)10. Parkin states that Ardener’s (1971) analytical priority was not the
word “witch.” For him, this was only a curtain between acts in the on-
going drama of how to deal with disaster: a simultaneity of allusions, and
parallel innuendos, cross-varying perspectives that eventually come to-
gether in the word (Parkin 2015:5–6).
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texts—emphasized ambiguity as the remarkable feature of
ritual and other ways of creating “magical” forces. A repre-
sentation that is singularly ambiguous lies at the basis of magic
(Mauss 1950:107). Lévi-Strauss focused on certain linguistic
features, which Mauss did not fail to notice. Mauss, however,
did not “make as much of them as he should” (Lévi-Strauss
1950:49). Lévi-Strauss notes thatmany Papuan andMelanesian
languages have only one word to designate buying or selling,
lending and borrowing. Antithetical operations are expressed
by the same word, indicating a reciprocal relationship. Lévi-
Strauss further considers a semantic function, whose role is to
enable symbolic thinking to operate despite the contradiction
inherent in it. He addresses the insoluble antinomies of certain
words and notions, or the fundamental contradictions “which
struck ethnographers so forcibly” (1950:63–64).
William Empson’s oeuvre allows us to bring home such
debates to a European context of literary criticism. In his
analysis of forms of ambiguity in the English literary tradition,
he deﬁnes a seventh type of ambiguity: when the two mean-
ings of a word, the two values of the ambiguity, are opposites.
Among illustrations of this seventh type from four centuries
of English poetry, Empson invokes “primitive” languages but
adds that “there seems nothing peculiarly primitive about
the sentiment” and “identity of opposites.”11 He mentions that
early Egyptians apparently wrote the same sign for “young”
and “old.” He cites the Latin altus, high or deep. Other ex-
amples are from a more recent era. He considers Arabic a strik-
ing case of the mental sophistication required to use a word
that covers its own opposite. Such words are considered to be
of a late origin and were elaborated as a literary style. Likewise,
the many English examples are all later developments. For ex-
ample, the English “let” as “allow” or “hinder,” and “prone” as
either “active,” “tending to,” or “inactive and lying ﬂat” in re-
tirement or with a lover. Empson deﬁnes the notion of “rela-
tional opposites,” which very much speaks to the realities ad-
dressed in the work of the Sanskritist Renou: “to know what a
ruled person is youmust knowwhether the ruler is a general or
an archbishop. Thus a word, which names both parts of a re-
lation, may be more precise than a word, which only names
half of it” (Empson 1930:192, 194–195).
Empson concludes that, though such words appeal to fun-
damental habits of the human mind, they are to be expected
from a rather sophisticated state of language and feeling. This
seventh type of ambiguity is a powerful literary weapon among
the English, reﬂecting either a contradiction of thought or a
contradiction of feelings and impulses. To discover what shade
of interpretation is put on “the blank cheque of a paradox”
deﬁnes the meaning of the verses Empson addresses (Empson11. This concerns the work of Edmund Spenser (1552–1599), William
Shakespeare (1564–1616), John Donne (1572–1631), George Herbert
(1593–1633), Richard Crashaw (1613–1649), John Dryden (1631–1700),
John Keats (1795–1821), and A. C. Swinburne (1837–1909).
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within single words (the topic of this paper), Empson does not pretend to
decide, and much of it is clearly in the overt grammatical form A is B
(Empson 1951:389).
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needs to be an impulse to state two opposites deﬁned by their
contexts and a collision of a genuine pair of opposites. A violent
and deep-rooted ambivalence, or two systems of judgement, are
forced into open conﬂict before the reader. This is sometimes
achieved by successive ﬁreworks of contradiction and a mind
jumping like a ﬂea. Empson highlights how Keats often used
ambiguity of the seventh type to convey a dissolution of normal
experience into the intensity of sensation. Examples from Cra-
shaw reveal how the religious and the sexual are both contexts
that deﬁne the opposites. This seventh type of ambiguity is
about ﬁnding a narrow border of experience that both hold in
common—using one as a metaphor for another would be an
ambiguity of another type. The seventh type stands, as it were,
for the point of friction between two worlds conceived together.
It transpires as a necessary method to deal with the most deeply
rooted and complicated notion of the humanmind. This notion
of ambiguity constitutes a literary method that can address the
experience of killing someone as well as sexual desire (Empson
1930:197, 201, 214, 218, 223, 226, 233).
Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity thus provides a crucial
point of reference to deﬁne antipodal utterances and modes
of expression within our cultural heritage. This fourth image
is determined by the friction between two worlds “conceived
together” and the narrow border of experience that two in-
commensurable worlds hold in common, as evoked by the
English. The terms of the debate here appear to conjure an-
thropological tropes rather than modern linguistics or even
literary criticism: the dissolution of normal experience, the in-
tensity of sensation. Indeed, this is a theme that resonates with
this paper’s introduction; Empson references “the experience
of killing someone” or inhabiting a gray zone between inhu-
manity and humanity.
In The Structure of Complex Words, Empson introduces
words that carry rival doctrines and deﬁnes words that have a
very high degree of integration of their meanings. The latter
include paradoxes, written via the formula Ap 2A. The
function of such a paradox is to hint at some reconciliation
that is otherwise ineffable. Moreover, it does not seem to be
two ideas equated but one idea contradicted. Some words
may suffer from a breakdown of reciprocity, as the word is to
be used in one way about me and in another way about you.
Empson provides examples of a general “trick of the mind,”
which he ﬁnds among individual theorists and (literary) styl-
ists rather than in common use. About Jane Austen’s use of
the word “sensible,” he writes “the adjective was likely to be
a no-man’s-land between the two factions” (1951:30, 52–53,
59, 306). Empson pays tribute to Kenneth Burke (1941) but
comments “he was not as I understand it thinking of the
analysis of single words.” Empson does, and the movement
he has in mind is simply “a narrow thing within one word”
(1951:66; see also 347, 350, 386).
Here it is important to recollect the second image I depicted
or, more generally, Renou’s contribution. Empson alerts us to
a word’s value being applied to both of two opposite extremes,This content downloaded from 081.096.1
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(1951:313). Empson adds:
The most striking recent work on the kind of linguistics I
am trying to consider here has been a very untechnical one;
it is in the dreadful book 1984 which George Orwell wrote
while dying. What he calls “double-think”, a process of in-
tentional but genuine self-deception, easy to reach but hard
to hold permanently, really does seem to be a positive ca-
pacity of the human mind, so curious and so important in
its effects that any theory in this ﬁeld needs to reckon with
it. (1951:83, emphasis added)
This affordance of the human mind is also depicted by Emp-
son as a vague feeling. A referent is often given a solid quality,
and you can feel that the word somehow covers it. Still, is there
more to it? For Empson, this kind of feeling is not merely
primitive or illogical, but it keeps us in contact with reality.
This becomes more acute when he addresses what I would call
antipodal words. Empson’s treatise on the English word “dog”
leads him to a vision of the word that carries a duality of feeling
or is ameeting ground of two rival theologies. Furthermore, for
the purpose of rhetoric and in order to sound good, the strain
may well need to be inside the words themselves.12 Most of our
words, though, are dead symbols, only interesting in view of
their referents (Empson 1951:387). Others are given a life of
their own through literary practice over centuries (1951:158–
184, 317–318, 354, 387, 430).
In a crucial passage, Empson evokes the notion of pretence,
which I propose to interpret as a kind of awareness. He states
that rhetorical form is used for a form of pretence of false
identity. A sentence is framed so that we realize how different
its words would appear to the opponent. One may call this the
device prior to irony that keeps alive both sides of the debate,
or one might merely say that it invokes “the old magic.” This,
however, projects us beyond the deﬁnition of magic in an-
thropology cited at the beginning of this section. To keep alive
both sides and give complex words a life of their own is the
business of a writer (like Empson). If a dictionary is to seem
more than a toy, a living dictionary ought to be written that
brings to life complex words. It shows no respect to the living
language to treat all words as rubble (1951:387, 390–391, 409,
412), and one but wishes Empson was around to treat us to a
dictionary of the jaguar.
Empson had written the Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930)
at the young age of 22. Serendipitous events soon after led
him to take up a position in Tokyo and study Buddhist sculp-
tures across the far East and South Asia for over a decade.
The resulting monograph went missing just before the Second
World War and became one of the great lost books, to be
rediscovered only recently (Empson 2016). The mindset and56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
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tirely on the basis of literary criticism of English poetry, now
was transposed to the study of Buddhism and its cultural legacy.
Empson proposed a close textual reading of Buddhist images
and highlighted the dual signiﬁcance of the face of the Buddha,
as the right and left side revealed asymmetry and suggested
contradictory moods, paradox, or conﬂicting spiritual and emo-
tional states (2016:xiv, 72). I end this section with a quote from
The Face of the Buddha, to illuminate the ethos of this paper
and its ﬁve differing images. Here, radical cross-cultural theo-
retical engagement appears to be encompassed within the life
of a single author—Empson. He writes about a Buddha: “the
puzzlement and the good humour are all on the left, also
the maternity and the rueful but amiable smile. The right is the
divinity; a birdlike innocence and wakefulness; unchanging
in irony, unresting in good works; not interested in humanity
or for that matter in itself ’ (2016:100, emphasis added). I now
propose to reﬂect on the notion of irony and indeed wakeful-
ness or vigilance in the remaining sections of this paper.13. The entity Kristeva posits as being anterior to any space, lacking a
thesis or position, unity, or identity is often usurped by her notion of
(Freudian) instinctual drives. However, Kristeva’s work on the structure
of poetic and carnivalesque language transcends this Freudian imagery
and takes into account sociopolitical circumstances (1980:6, 72).
14. Kristeva notes that Bakhtin—born of a revolutionary Russia—
highlights both subjectivity and intertextuality, a blurred subjectivity yield-
ing to ambivalence (1980:68).Fifth Image
Denunciation of the Substantive in Postmodern Cosmology
Perspectivism was a term coined by Friedrich Nietzsche in
The Will To Power (1910:20). I deploy the original German Per-
spectivismus to distinguish it from a contemporary anthropo-
logical usage of the term I discussed above. Perspectivismus
also entails a deliberation on the status of the word: every in-
stinct is a thirst for power, each with a point of view, and the
word is but the horizon line of our knowledge, designating
the limits of a perspective. Where our ignorance begins—at
that point from which we can see no further—we set a word.
Nietzsche considers our belief in the notion of “substance” to be
a formulation of a grammatical custom. Our concept of sub-
stance—a very powerful faith—is conceived as an outcome
of our concept of the subject. The subject connotes our belief
in an entity underlying all the different moments of intense
sensation of reality. We believe in our belief to such an extent
that—on its account alone—we imagine “substantiality” (1910:
13–15). Nietzsche concludes that our ontological categories are
illusions perpetuated by the chance subject/predicate structure
and grammatical habits of Indo-European languages (Benes
2006:220). In other words, familiar categories of reality reﬂect
a misplaced faith in our grammar. Note that Nietzsche argued
that a modern metaphysics of language in the Indo-European
tradition hides brutal realities governed by a will to power (Benes
2006:226–227). This is important, given this paper’s subsidiary
theme: being human in the face of inhuman brutality and re-
ﬂecting such incommensurable worlds in language. Hence the
paper’s ﬁrst image focused on Amerindian languages and the
dictionary of the jaguar.
Perspectivismus encapsulated Nietzsche’s theoretical end-
point of an embattled Euro-American cosmology (Nietzsche
1910:13, 20). The death of God and his concomitant universalThis content downloaded from 081.096.1
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or multiple, ﬂuid points of view. The perspectival character of
existence in Nietzsche’s oeuvre (Nietzsche in Williams 2001:
169, 239) offered a gloomy forecast of a Euro-American post-
modern culture or ironic condition. Nietzsche’s doubt regard-
ing Indo-European languages and a modern faith in substan-
tiality provides a welcome supplement to the development of
this paper, articulated in relation to both the pronominal par-
adigm of modern linguistics and a historical and ethnographic
reﬂection on the notion of the “substantive.” A Nietzschean
tactic to question our faith in (modern) grammar leads me to
consider postmodern cosmology in a ﬁnal and ﬁfth image of
the antipodal utterance.
A focal point for the study of antipodal words in this culture
is Kristeva’s call for a linguistics other than the one descended
from the phenomenological heavens. She brings together the
notions of phenomenon—an observable reality experienced
from the ﬁrst-person point of view—and heaven, a key ele-
ment of a Christian belief system. The episteme of modern
linguistics therefore appears as a symptom of the drama ex-
perienced by the Western subject as it attempts to master and
structure not only the logos but also its translogical breakouts.
Kristeva notes that the adherence of modern linguistics to the
phenomenological subject describes stability where one should
acknowledge mobility, unity where there may be contradiction
(Kristeva 1980:6, 27, 72, 146).13
Establishing a sign system calls for the identity of a speak-
ing subject within a social framework, which is recognized as
the basis for such an identity. At times of abrupt changes, re-
newal, and revolution in society, such bases for identiﬁcation
shift. Once the social framework with which one had formerly
identiﬁed is challenged, the subject undergoes an unsettling
process. A previously established sign system faces counter-
vailing forces (Roudiez 1980:18, quoting Kristeva 1975). Kris-
teva includes such societal considerations in her analyses of the
language of carnival, or what she calls a carnivalesque logic.
Within the carnival, the structure of the author emerges as
an anonymity that sees itself as self and other, or as man and
mask. For Kristeva, the fundamental problem is to describe this
other logic without denaturing it or appropriating it via an ill-
suited vocabulary. She proposes a “shift from subjectivism to
ambivalence.” Such an ambivalence is not only linked to rapid
societal change and revolution, as highlighted above, but also
the realities of death, birth, and sex (Kristeva 1980:74, 78–89).14
When literature touches upon such strategic points—at the
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absence, a blank space, Kristeva states.15
Such an emptiness is subtly different from the felt sub-
jectivity inherent in Bakhtinian dialogism: the coming-and-
going movement between subject and other, speaker and in-
terlocutor, or writer and reader in poststructuralist thought
(1980:74–75). Kristeva introduces the almost counterintuitive
notion of “the logic of nonexclusive opposition” to describe the
ambivalent spaces within carnivalesque language (1980:72,
86). I propose to reiterate this as a logic in which each oppos-
ing social framework is not omitted from consideration or
excluded. Ambivalence and nonexclusive opposition displace
the imagery of subjectivism.Kristeva thus brings togethermany
of the themes articulated by the authors I quoted to depict the
previous four images of the antipodal utterance; death/preda-
tion, birth/survival, sexual desire, and political ﬂux/revolution.
Deleuze’s work has comparable implications for both sub-
jectivity and modern metalanguage. He deconstructs the no-
tion of an individualized form of a world, or world corre-
sponding to individuals. Deleuze contemplates paradox or the
event that moves in two directions at once and fragments the
subject following this double direction. A Deleuzian image
of subjectivity emerges as continuous displacement—as being
always displaced in relation to itself. A subterranean principle
of counter-sense is imposed on sense, in a world of disjunctive
synthesis. Deleuze stresses this is not merely a reversal of per-
spectives but acknowledges the bidirectionality of this con-
tinuous motion.16 Such a postmodern cosmology and philos-
ophy of language denounces the false simplicity of language
and questions whether there might not be two languages and
two sorts of “names,” only one of them designating the pauses
and rests, or even two distinct dimensions internal to language,
when substantives and adjectives begin to dissolve (Deleuze
2004:4–5, 83, 87–89, 157, 205, 261, 339).17 I hereby propose
that this ﬁnal image of the antipodal utterance to be charac-
terized as the dissolved sign of postmodernism.
Deleuze’s characterization of this dissolution parallels the
realities of death, violence, sacriﬁce, or dehumanization ex-
empliﬁed in this paper. At the same time that bodies lose their
unity and the self its identity, language loses its denoting
function, its distinct sort of integrity: not as someone who
expresses himself but with respect to something that is purely
expressed. Such a Deleuzian paradigm transforms the model of15. The imagery of emptiness recurs in Kristeva’s work on the empty
sets or disjunctive additions of carnivalesque language, as she describes
“the vacancy of judging consciousness and sign” (1980:79, 142).
16. For a Deleuzian rendition of ambiguity in the conceptual universe
of Cuban divination and the current role of a postmodern descriptive
language in anthropology, see Holbraad (2012). For a further discussion
of Deleuzian anthropology and the concept of disjunctive synthesis or
inclusive disjunction, see Viveiros de Castro (2009). To compare with the
notion of “internal discontinuities,” see Strathern (1991:xxiii).
17. Note the same metaphor of “dissolving the sign” emerged in Kris-
teva’s semanalysis (1980:18).
This content downloaded from 081.096.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms alanguage—being different from a subjectivity expressing itself.
An integrity of language seems at odds with the several worlds
of a Deleuzian philosophy. Deleuze shatters the boundaries of
our contemporary metalanguage by postulating an experimen-
tal personal pronoun, the fourth person singular (with every
signiﬁcation suspended), for a description of the dissolved self,
lost identity, and copresence of sense and nonsense (Deleuze
2004:133, 159–160, 338). It is notable that it is indeed a pro-
noun or pronominal expression that manages to capture De-
leuze’s malaise.
This ﬁfth image also needs to take into account the wider
postmodern cosmology or ironic condition surrounding these
theories of the sign. Lambek notes irony is a recognition of the
inherent incompleteness of any particular form of knowledge
and denotes perspectivism. Irony is a dimension of self-
understanding, as one is cognizant of the limitations of one’s
own perspective. Irony stands for the uncertainty of holding
things in a double vision, or not to speak with an assurance one
does not have. It is not necessarily an intentional discursive
strategy but is embedded within particular cultural genres.
Irony may be cynical, humorous, or detached, but often it is
something deeply felt, some inner recognition about the con-
tingency of truth. As such, irony is highlighted in the religions
of many non-Western societies (Lambek 2004:3, 5, 7–8, 11,
16). Burke understood irony as a consideration of the stand-
point of the participation of all the terms rather then from the
standpoint of any one participant (Burke 1945:513). A further
comparison with Burke’s notion of “true irony” is apposite.
True irony does not denote a superiority to the enemy but is
based upon a sense of fundamental kinship with the enemy—
as one needs him, is indebted to him, is not merely outside him
as an observer—but contains him within. True irony denotes
being consubstantial with the enemy (Burke 1945:513–514).
Lambek, however, alerts us to a possible important distinction
and the speciﬁcity of a postmodern cosmology. He argues that,
on the contrary, postmodern irony has served as a form of con-
ceit, of knowing both sides, and denotes a sense of superiority
to the enemy (Lambek 2004:12).
A critical consideration of ironic modes is particularly rel-
evant for contemporary anthropologists, both in terms of their
own cosmology and the realities encountered in the ﬁeld. Fer-
nandez and Huber consider the ambivalent self as a key feature
of the postcolonial condition (Fernandez and Huber 2001:29)
and reiterate Brown’s call for an ironic ethnography (Brown
1999). This kind of ethnography recognizes the indeterminacy
and contingency of the experience of the people constructed as
marginal by expansive states—their shifts in allegiance and the
ambiguity of their past and present (2001:25). Marcus argues
our times are especially prone to irony (Marcus 2001). This
ironic predicament is enhanced by globalization or the reach
of nonlocal agencies into the local, so that conventional ideas of
the social no longer have authority (Marcus 2001:211). This
recalls Kristeva’s focus on challenges to the social framework
and times of abrupt changes in society as well as Renou’s atten-
tion to volatile political circumstances. I therefore recognize that56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Pillen A Space That Will Never Be Filled 000a theory of the sign in these circumstances may well be un-
derstoodmore swiftly on the basis of a postmodern cosmology.
However, it may help to pay attention to each image of the
antipodal utterance I sketched—each belonging to a differing
world and analysis—to distinguish them from all too familiar
postmodern forms of irony, or a superiority to the enemy.
Concluding Remarks
I deﬁned the antipodal utterance as a sign that encompasses a
radical opposition of meaning and perspective. Such a vo-
cabulary appears to evoke a Bakhtinian notion of “freedom of
language” (Kristeva 1980). This concerns speech freed from
historical constraints, when the word has no fear of incrim-
inating itself and is free from presupposed values—“without
distinguishing between virtue and vice.” Kristeva remarks that
“it has been impossible for classicism or any other authori-
tarian society to express itself ” in this type of language (Kris-
teva 1980:82–83).18 However, this is not just about a mere
celebration of irony and perspectivism.We need to consider an
inevitable and context-speciﬁc balance between perspectiv-
ism and a working stability of language and meaning (Lam-
bek 2004:16). Note that, within Amerindian perspectivism,
the experience of simultaneity of perspectives only occurs in
shamanic performance—only shamans are capable of transi-
ting the various perspectives (Viveiros de Castro 1998:483). In
work by Devisch, it is ritual devices that cultivate a simulta-
neity of opposites for the afﬂicted (Devisch 1993). However,
the texts by Renou and Malamoud on ancient India enable us
to consider the possibility of a more pervasive use of antipodal
utterances.
This paper indeed concerns only linguistic techniques and
the antipodal word. It is, however, of interest to note Severi’s
analysis of visual paradox and the ritual image. In situations
of intense conﬂict, the anthropological concept of syncretism
appears to be incomplete and overhasty. A paradoxical ﬁgure
emerged among the Apache: a ﬁgure doubly deﬁned as not
only Christ on the cross but also Lightning and Snake—the
image of a cruciﬁed snake. Severi concludes that the memories
of an extremely violent conﬂict engender not just a cultural
hybrid, a mixture of cultural traditions, “but, well and truly,
a paradox.” Among European Christians involved in the con-
quest, he discerns a similar process: “Lady Sebastiana, like the
Apache Christ, embodies and at the same time confronts her
enemy.” Images on both sides become transformed (Severi 2015:
22–23, 268, 273, 279, 288, 325, 333–334).
Severi makes use of the term “complex images” to describe
images that take a form that is not linear but is based on
simultaneity and a condensation of contradictory elements.
Here I pay attention to the “indispensable vocabulary” mobi-18. This is a verbatim quote from Kristeva (1980:83), which I inter-
pret here as a comment on language ideology within authoritarian so-
cieties, with particular reference to classicism and the novel in postme-
dieval Europe.
This content downloaded from 081.096.1
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ﬂict, which include paradox (Severi 2015:23, 313, 317, 324,
332). I notice a synergy between this visual anthropology and
the vocabularies I quoted when depicting images of the an-
tipodal word. Chimera—a reference to the monstrous hybrid
creatures of Greek mythology—lends itself well for a visual
anthropology of “intense images of unresolved conﬂict” (Severi
2015:318). I opted for the term “antipodal” to accentuate the
emptiness and inherent tension of verbal paradox.
Viveiros de Castro’s call for a perspectivist theory of the sign
leads me to a consideration of Kristeva’s notion of the sign as
matrix (1980:146). An antipodal matrix differs from the image
of the word implied within the concept of indexicality, or a
focal point fromwhichmultiple contextual meanings emanate.
Kristeva addressed the presuppositions of our metalanguage,
which are not necessarily productive (1980:88). Antipodal ut-
terances are not necessarily amenable to an analysis on the
basis of the notion of indexicality. Subjectivism and indexi-
cality appear as two sides of the same coin. A perspective in-
duced by a subjectivity lies at the basis of indexical meaning
(Benveniste 1966:227).19
Hanks considers the classical deﬁnition of indexicality and
the variety of things the term is applied to. For Peirce, an in-
dexical sign stands in a relation of “dynamical coexistence”
with its object. In other words, the indexical and what it stands
for are, in a sense, copresent in the context of the utterance.
Hanks argues that the concept of contiguity on which index-
icality is based must be deﬁned relative to local standards of
copresence and relevance (2001:119–120). The question is
whether, in the case of the antipodal utterance, spatiotemporal
or contextual contiguity is relevant. Radical semantic rupture,
or U-turns in meaning, presuppose simultaneity and tension.
The principle of simultaneity characterizing the antipodal
utterance appears to be at odds with the sequentiality inherent
within a pronominal paradigm, or the sequence of “momen-
tary references” characterizing indexicality (Benveniste 1966:
226). Such words denote a simultaneous awareness or the cog-
nitive existence of opposing contexts, which is not readily cap-
tured by the notion of indexicality or the sequentiality of shift-
ing contexts of speech. The simultaneity of the opposing worlds
questions the necessity of spatiotemporal contiguity and sub-
verts a core principle of an observational method within lin-
guistic anthropology: indexicality. I would therefore argue that
nonmodern metalanguages (or indeed metaritual) may provide
a valuable vantage point for an anthropology of language.
Varzi’s work on the spatial realities of afﬂuent youth in
Northern Tehran draws a comparable analytical image. Living
at the crossroads of Chanel scarves and the Islamic republic’s
images of martyrdom, such youths inhabit a hyperreality char-19. In Kuechler’s work, related topics are addressed through a critique
of “anthropological modeling.” A conception of space as proceeding from
the human body becomes deconstructed. “De-centered spatial cognition,”
in Kuechler’s analysis, appears as a key term to take into account multiple
reference systems (2003:213, 218).
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000 Current Anthropology Volume 58, Number 6, December 2017acterized by hypervigilance—the ability to be in two or three
different spaces at once, or not at all. She highlights the youth’s
hyperawareness and capacity to exist in two or more spatio-
temporal dimensions simultaneously. The image of the enemy
within, or the close-by enemy, emerges. More importantly,
Varzi argues that modernist ideological projects and revolu-
tions are unlikely to ﬁnd success in societies where people have
become adept atmoving through such hyperrealities (2006:128,
130). This vigilance, highlighted in the work of Varzi (2006)
as well as in Viveiros de Castro’s analysis of shamanic vision
(2007:16, 19), constitutes an entry point to consider the paper’s
initial quote by Borges.20 People may well be “afﬂicted with
unreality” simply by being less vigilant and by not truly paying
attention to opposing worlds—“as so many Englishmen are”
(Borges 1944:10).21 I hereby deﬁne the antipodal utterance as
the linguistic counterpart of hyperreal gestures and modes-of-
being based on the simultaneity of opposites. I propose to call
this sharp communication, as this not only concerns utterances
but also perceptiveness and alertness—vigilance. The lattermay
well include what Empson called “a birdlike wakefulness; un-
changing in irony” (2016:100).
I suggest that this kind of awareness has been addressed by
Fabian’s term “negativity.” Consensus and dialogue appear as
“suffocatingly positive,” as do identity and authenticity. Neg-
ativity or the negation of concepts and beliefs constitutes a
deeper challenge. Regarding case material on storytelling in
Lubumbashi, Fabian states “we no longer have before us a dis-
tinction or separation of two worlds or two kinds of discourses
about the world, but a contradiction” (2001:88–91).22 After
a rereading of Adorno’s Negative Dialektik (1966), Fabian es-
chews the term “dialectical” (2001:89, 218).Heprefers to “avoid
dealing with contradiction dialectically and dissolve it into
harmless difference” (J. Fabian, personal communication). The
trivial or mechanistic meanings of “dialectics”—and its stulti-
fying mathematics that turns the negation of a negation into
positivity—aredisavowed.Otherkeywords appearon thescene,
such as cultural self-suspicion (or the split of a culture into
itself and its suspicion of itself ), the notions of survival and the
history of negation, self-mockery, incongruity, and the per-
formative work of negation—parody and irony. Negativity is20. Bear in mind a key aspect of Viveiros de Castro’s ethnography of
Amerindian perspectivism or “the capacity to see oneself as the enemy”
(1992:249).
21. Kohn addresses a similar idea articulated by the Runa in Ecuador’s
Upper Amazon as he coins the term “cosmological autism.” The challenge
for the Runa is to avoid the state ofmonadic isolation by which they lose the
ability to be aware of other selves that inhabit the cosmos. Cosmological
autism stands for a lack of awareness or the loss of the ability to recognize
other perspectives, and Kohn includes a valuable list of examples (2007:12,
20).
22. The example cited here does not concern a single antipodal word
but is a stock phrase and opening line of stories told in Swahili. The
opposing terms hadisi (truth from hadith) and bongo (lie) are juxtaposed
in a proverbial expression that Fabian retranslates as “story appears, lie
appears”: a contradiction between truth and lie (2001:91, 218).
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and in the positivity that goes with taking positions” (2001:89–
90, 93–94, 97, 99, 100). In my understanding, the quote taken
fromMalamoud’s work (1996) and title of this paper—a space
that will never be ﬁlled—can accentuate such a performative
and communicative stance. Fabian’s negativity or distrust of
occupying a position appears linked to an awareness and per-
formance of undissolved contradiction—not fettered by dia-
lectical ties.
This paper is made of a superposition of supplementary
images of this kind of awareness and the sharp communication
that goes along with it (see table 2 for an overview). The as-
semblage of concordant images, each with a different starting
point, disciplinary remit, and vocabulary, conceived together,
entails a common conceptual thrust. This framework is cu-
mulative rather than exclusive, and the set of selected examples
is indeed arbitrary. Besides, each image needs to be differen-
tiated and speciﬁed against the background of a pervasive post-
modern mode of thought. This exercise involves a deconstruc-
tive linguistics but also a recognition of the limits of an
anthropology of linguistic phenomena as observable practice.
Antipodal utterances take on a key role for a delineation of the
“limits of a phenomenological linguistics” (Kristeva 1980:143).
Postmodern culture, however, does not necessarily provide a
privileged vantage point or language of analysis. The meta-
language of a modern linguistic anthropology, the well-oiled
paradigms of a literary criticism of the ironic, and Deleuzian
anthropologies at once support and subvert a possible anal-
ysis. Linguistic techniques utilized to address incommensura-
ble worlds—predation, risk, violence, sacriﬁce, revolution—are
likely to transcend representation by a modern metalanguage
and a postmodern understanding of irony.
Each image I depicted addresses a supplementary reality:
manioc beer for the Araweté, the notion of nawa in the Pano
languages of Amazonia, fula for the Yaka, the Sanskrit notion
of footstep and substantive, the seventh type of ambiguity for
the English, Nietzsche’s brutal realities, Burke’s true irony, or a
postmodern emptiness and perpetual motion. They can be
scrutinized in terms of being an essential anchor for a study of
sharp communication. This decentered analytical framework
features a range of independent concepts that point in a sim-
ilar direction: Viveiros De Castro’s shamanic experience of
perspectivism, Renou’s ambiguity of the referent, Detienne’s
intermediate zone, Malamoud’s suspended betweenness, De-
visch’s Janusian thought, Burke’s consubstantiality in true irony,
Kristeva’s logic of nonexclusive opposition, or a Deleuzian con-
tinuously displaced subjectivity. Sharp communication is but
a term; a nexus to justify the superposition of the ﬁve images
I chose.
Some of the images are difﬁcult to classify as religious or sec-
ular, Eastern or Western. Renou’s oeuvre confounds our no-
tions of grammar, metalanguage, and religion. Meanwhile, the
intellectual trajectories of both William Empson and Julia Kris-
teva point eastward. Kristeva’s pioneering work in the late six-
ties went hand in hand with the sinology of Joseph Needham,56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
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Needham’s Science and Civilisation in China (1954), a bridge of
monumental proportions between the cultural history of China
and the West. Kristeva learned Chinese and visited China with
the Tel Quel group (see Kristeva 1977). This intellectual un-
dercurrent has perhaps been overshadowed by the role Kristeva
played in Roland Barthes’s seminar, her reading of Bakhtin and
coinage of intertextuality, or more generally the development
of poststructuralist thought in France. Empson’s Structure of
Complex Words was published in 1951 after spending forma-
tive years in Tokyo (1931–1934) and Beijing (1937–1939, 1947–
1953).24 The synopsis of images 4 and 5 in table 2 should be read
while keeping these personal pathways in mind (also see note 5
as well as this paper’s references to Bachnik’s work [1982, 1986,
1994]).
The handshake and gesture of a survivor of torture that I
depicted at the beginning of this paper allude to the possible
wider relevance of a study of the simultaneity of opposites. The
tension of being and being seen “like a wolf” or a man, being
addressed as predator or human, constitutes the antipodal na-
ture of this encounter. The “region or moment of indiscern-
ibility between the human and nonhuman” is evoked.25 This
paper concerns the blurred boundary between humanity and
the world of animals and enemies, more speciﬁcally the lin-
guistic manifestations of this gray zone.26 A struggle for sur-
vival regardless of human traditions, the brutality of war, pre-23. Kristeva, personal communication, meeting of the Kristeva Circle,
Stockholm, Sweden, October 13–16, 2016.
24. Notable is the brief reference to the Taoist word, as Empson
argues one should always try to interpret paradoxes and recognize con-
tradiction (1951:53).
25. An expression I borrow from Viveiros de Castro (2007:15).
26. For my earlier research within this ﬁeld or a linguistic anthro-
pology of extreme violence, see Argenti-Pillen (2003) and Pillen (2015)
as well as a recent discussion of language and the translation of expe-
riences we have dubbed “traumatic” (Pillen 2016).
This content downloaded from 081.096.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms adation of fellow humans, and sexual desire become sedimented
into antipodal utterances. The relative objectivity of our eth-
nographic endeavor inherent in its metalinguistic props leads
to the portrayal of cultures in which perspectivist or ironic
stances and their potential may be underrepresented. Fernan-
dez and Huber regard ideological overcommitment and over-
conﬁdence—or all the arrogant self-satisfactions characteristic
of partisanship—as the source of much adversity. Meanwhile,
fallibilism and a sense of human frailty induced by irony are
to be valued as a particularly effective kind of politics, or rather
antipolitics (Fernandez and Huber 2001:17). Antipodal utter-
ances bring incommensurable worlds into sharp cognitive re-
lief and make them susceptible to consciousness and accurate
consideration. I therefore do not loose sight of the political
dimension of this debate, epitomized in the work of Renou as
he translates: “May the law protect me against the law” (1939:
231). It is a tolerance for this kind of multiplicity, which for
us—still modern subjects—might indeed be enigmatic.
Irony, alone, piercing through the linguist’s metalanguage, is
the timid witness to this drama. (Kristeva 1980:27)Acknowledgments
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In A Space That Will Never Be Filled, Dr. Pillen puts forward
a compelling case for a term that refers to the simultaneous
manifestation of opposing worlds and utterances—antipodal.
Antipodal encompasses a radical opposition of meaning and
perspective. As an introduction to its manifestation, we are
treated to a rather terrifying ﬁeldnote, recounted originally
in Kurdish, of how Lorîn’s husband met his torturer unex-
pectedly while thinking he was going to redecorate a ﬂat.
Dr. Pillen explores the antithetical worlds encapsulated in this
moment when the men, who were once “wolves,” or enemies
to each other, are unexpectedly reunited as humans (albeit
trembling ones). This provides the starting point for a “cross-
disciplinary search for the linguistic counterparts to this kind
of gesture,”where words “contain their opposite and embody a
U-turn in meaning.” The antipodal utterance is thus explored
through ﬁve distinct case studies, or images.This content downloaded from 081.096.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aThe ﬁrst image takes us to the Amazon and an animist
society where a drink may be understood as manioc beer or
blood, depending on whether you inhabit the world of humans
or jaguars. Only shamans can “see” both properties at once,
with their ability to transcend worlds and take on different
forms. Deﬁning “manioc beer as an antipodal utterance,” we
learn of its simultaneous meaning, only held in place when
worlds are ontologically ﬁxed. In the second image, we learn,
through Renou’s study of the metalanguage of Sanskrit, how
this is a “device to study antipodal utterances.” Here, an “enig-
matic word might draw its strength from the tension of the
question to which it gives rise or the space opened up by this
question.” In the third image, we learn of the prevalence of the
simultaneity of opposites during sacriﬁce and divination.
At this image, my mind is drawn to the opening ﬁeldnote.
Can one inhabit the two worlds simultaneously—the wolf and
the human? Is a trembling hand the slow possible manifesta-
tion of its opposite? Certainly, from the opening example, one
can imagine a tension existing between two worlds on the
brink of colliding, but this does not seem to be the same as the
possibility of the shaman’s position in the Amazon, being able
to see both beer and blood. The men in the opening example
do not turn into wolves; they remain trembling humans to
each other, ﬁxed in their positions, even if the possibility of a
U-turn exists as a potential.
By the time we get to the fourth image, we learn of the
“border of experience that two incommensurable worlds hold
in common” in English poetry. The poets argue for “a narrow
thing within one word,” not something between worlds, and
so, again, the suspension of opposites appears to be the line in
between the two, rather than their simultaneity, something
vastly different from the world of the jaguar and the world of
the human. One wonders how lines of comparison are being
drawn, but the tension is sustained.
In the ﬁfth image, we learn how postmodern cosmology
allows for opposing frameworks, or logics, to be maintained as
they exist in parallel, drawing the subject in multiple direc-
tions, something characteristic of “the dissolved sign of post-
modernism.” This ﬁnal point reminds me somewhat of Fou-
cault’s (1986 [1967]) description of the paradoxical power of
the mirror. On the one hand, the mirror is a kind of utopia;
it opens up a virtual space below the surface, giving “my own
visibility to myself.” (24). On the other hand, it is also a kind
of heterotopia. “From the standpoint of the mirror I disco-
ver my absence from the place where I am since I see myself
over there” (24), and in order to do so, I have to pass through
a virtual point. This visual paradox, and the ﬁne line it in-
stantiates between two images, brings to mind the idea of
ﬁgure-ground reversals and the contour between two images
or senses, which is sometimes held in place and sometimes
quivers and shatters.
In my own work on the role of mirrors in Mongolian house-
holds that reveal two perspectives simultaneously (Empson
2011), I have examined the Rubin vase-proﬁle illusion. De-
veloped in 1915 by the psychologist Edgar Rubin, the vase-56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
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proﬁles facing each other in front of a white background or a
white vase on a black background. Rubin developed this image
to illustrate the dynamic nature of subtle perceptual processes.
Because one of the contours of the image is shared with the
other, it is difﬁcult to perceive both images simultaneously.
Instead, our vision ﬂuctuates between the vase and the proﬁles.
As one image becomes the background, the other becomes the
foreground and vice versa. The ability to see one image and
then the other, but not the two simultaneously, is referred to as
“contour rivalry” (i.e., we shift attention between the shape and
the contour). The reversal of images that the observer perceives
in the vase-proﬁle illusion is due to their individual tendency
toward biasing either the shapes or contours, making one
interpretation stronger than the other (Arnheim 2002 [1954]:
223). Only, perhaps, the Amazonian shaman, or the post-
modern subject, or even the Mongolian visitor who sees them-
selves in the mirror at the household chest, can see the two
perspectives simultaneously.Momentarily, opposites are held in
place so that, ﬂickering into view, a new image emerges sharply.
What is the context that allows for such a moment? Is it a word,
the mobilization of a term, or a constellation of other things?
Right before the conclusion, Dr. Pillen states that it “may
help to pay attention to each image of the antipodal utterance
I sketched—each belonging to a differing world and analysis.”
This point seems crucial. Instead of being asked to hold them
simultaneously—that they are somehow connected—we are
invited to imagine that each image belongs to a different world.
In essence, the ﬁve images point to “concepts which point in
a similar direction” but are not exclusive or inclusive of each
other. Simultaneously connected, but also not connected at
all. Bringing incommensurable worlds into relief and into our
consideration momentarily does have an effect, and it is cer-
tainly an enigmatic juxtaposition (montage?). I am just not
sure howmuch they can be compared at all. In fact, it seems to
me that Dr. Pillen has the idea that these meanings should be
kept in tension through the ﬁve examples, pointing to the
parallel movement of meaning in antipodal words themselves
and their resistance to being held in any single place.
Instead of more images, it would be good to have more ex-
amples of sharp communication, to discern their actual sharp-
ness in action—that is, to perceive the realization of opposing
meanings as they unfurl. In Mongolian, where words have ef-
fects on worlds, much like actions shooting from the mouth,
this appears when someone praises a third person. Sometimes
with this praise comes the gradual realization that this utter-
ance is, in fact, its opposite (i.e., malicious slander or a curse).
Toomuch praise invites its polar opposite. The tension between
granting good wishes and instantiating their tipping point,
black curse words, is never exactly clear. Depending on context,
they may have opposite or simultaneous meanings and effects.
Sharp communication such as this is known as “White Black
TongueMouth” (tsagaan khar hel am). To hear more about the
antipodal utterance’s effects in action, such as the movement of
meaning of sharp words, would highlight the tension that isThis content downloaded from 081.096.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms akept in place as meanings are deferred or shift and allow us to
observe the power such words have on altering the worlds in
which they are uttered.Guilherme Orlandini Heurich
British Academy Newton International Fellow, University College
London, 14 Taviton Street, London WC1H 0BW, United Kingdom
(guiheurich@gmail.com). 13 III 17
Alexandra Pillen’s call for a redescription of the sign echoes
Viveiros de Castro’s (1998b) own in relation to Amerindian
metaphysics, and her paper provides us with the material to
understand what this new semiotic theory would not be—
focused on neither substance nor subject, neither property nor
authorship, and neither sequential nor consecutive—but leaves
us intrigued to know what it would look like and where we
might go fromhere. Two central aspects of her paper contribute
to a new theory of sign, her critique of the subject and the si-
multaneity of utterances, and the anthropology of language—
with its tendency to become lost in indexical forests—could
certainly beneﬁt from Pillen’s displacement of substance and
restriction of continuity. However, new semiotic theories have
emerged and then drowned during the last hundred years,
so there is always a chance that a new contender will simply
slip into old theoretical shoes. To suggest how this might be
avoided, I will address one of the most important ﬁgures in this
line of research, Ferdinand de Saussure, through recent philo-
sophical reinterpretations of his work, in order to highlight
those aspects of Pillen’s paper that could provide a path for an
alternative theory of the sign.
Perhaps one of the most enduring ideas about the sign is
that its meaning derives from the system in which it is placed
(i.e., from its relation to other signs), and it would seem that
Saussure put forward two ways to interpret this. On the one
hand, we can say that a sign’s identity is deﬁned by it not be-
ing what other signs are, that a sign goes through a process of
identiﬁcation that stabilizes its meaning by means of opposi-
tion to other signs. A sign is what other signs are not, and it
thus becomes a stable entity. However, a second possibility
emerges in which the sign is deﬁned by the intrinsic possibility
of not being what it is, which is how I understand Patrice
Maniglier’s recent (2005, 2006, 2007) reinterpretation of Saus-
sure. The chance that a sign could havemeant something else is
always lurking somewhere in its meaning, and this possibility
can never be erased, since it deﬁnes the sign as something that
could be something else. This does notmean that the sign could
have been something else or that it will be something different,
but it stresses that an Other is within the sign, here and now. In
this second understanding, identiﬁcation is only partial, and the
sign is never completely stabilized.
Maniglier also claims that Saussure puts forward a com-
pletely new syntactic theory, one which “is not the result of a
subject’s activity” and “is not based on the relationship be-56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
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and other possible contents” (Maniglier 2005:44). If we follow
Maniglier’s take on Saussure, this second approach allows us to
move away from notions such as substance, because “[w]hen
Sausurre states that the sign is a ‘double entity’ he does not
mean that it is anything like a double substance, but rather that
it is not substantial” (Maniglier 2006:276).
Both Maniglier’s discussion of the ontology of Ferdinand
de Saussure’s theory of the sign and Alexandra Pillen’s images
of the simultaneity of opposites lead us to rethink what sub-
stance means. When she discusses Bachnik’s (1982) work,
for example, Pillen acknowledges the inﬂuence of theatre and
drama in the deﬁnition of pronouns. This paradigm, in which
actors dialogue as authors and interlocutors, does not ﬁt well
with the images presented by Pillen. Finding a new semantic
landscape for people who converse through oppositional words
thus requires a shift from analysis focused on the subjects as
actors and authors to a perspective in which meaning is tense,
ambiguous, and ironic. We might add the idea that a sign is
open to the Other to this critique of the subject and the simul-
taneity of utterances: an Other who is not a subject, actor, or
author, but who might be oppositional, contrasting, and an-
tipodal. Pillen’s analysis would thus allow us to reconcile the
sign’s metaphysical aspect with an ethnographic description of
symbolic modes of existence that challenge Western concep-
tions. This would be a very important step—however small it
might seem—toward a redeﬁnition of the sign.Miglena Nikolchina
Department for Theory and History of Literature, University of
Soﬁa, 15 Tsar Osvoboditel Boulevard, 1504 Soﬁa, Bulgaria
(nikolchina@gmail.com). 6 III 17
Alfred North Whitehead, famously, makes the observation
that the European philosophical tradition “consists of a series
of footnotes to Plato” (1978:39). Less sweepingly, Jean-Luc
Nancy remarks that “every great study of Hegel is, in effect, a
study of the Aufhebung” (1973:18, n. 4). Today, after Alex
Pillen’s colorful anthropological study presented here, one
might be tempted to add that, in the last century or so, not only
European philosophy but a host of other theoretical ﬁelds have
provided, knowingly or not, a series of footnotes to Hegel’s
Aufhebung, this notorious term signifying, on the one hand,
annulment, destruction, and cancellation and, on the other,
preservation and conservation. In his reﬂections on the term,
Hegel turns the capacity of this word to embrace two opposite
sets of meanings into an example of the unique philosophical
advantages and “speculative spirit” of the German language.27
As Derrida notes in his own “sharp communications” (as we
could put it after Pillen) with the German philosopher, ac-27. For a discussion of this, see Carlson (2007:30, nn. 71–72).
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excellence [. . .], the concept whose untranslatable privilege is
wielded by the German language” (1978:257).
Alex Pillen’s reference to Hegel appears comparatively late
in her text. Pillen’s striking account of “antipodal utterances”
juxtaposes languages, rituals, gestures, and images and encom-
passes examples from manioc beer to postmodern emptiness
and perpetual motion. It brings together Viveiros De Castro,
Renou, Detienne, Malamoud, Devisch, Burke, Kristeva, Deleuze,
and more. Against this vibrant and, as she herself notes, cu-
mulative background, Hegel is introduced by Pillen through
Fabian’s critique of Hegelian dialectic, a critique that has been
a shared antipodal ground for various thinkers from Marx to
Adorno to Derrida and after. However, the antipodal term it-
self, Aufhebung, is never mentioned by Pillen. Nor is the other
most debated German concept, Freud’s das Unheimliche, this
uncanny word that negates and conﬁrms the two opposing
meanings of its antonym, das Heimliche, with both antonyms
designating simultaneously what is familiar and agreeable and
what is concealed and kept out of sight (Royle 2003).
Yet it is against this hidden philosophical and psychoana-
lytic tradition that the full scope of Pillen’s unheimlich ﬁndings,
so disquieting with their defamiliarized familiarity, might come
into relief. To begin with, there goes the speculative uniqueness
of the German language. Pillen’s survey with its wide geograph-
ical, historical, and discursive range demonstrates that the pro-
pensity for “words that contain their opposite and embody
a U-turn in meaning” does not belong to the untranslatable
privilege of a certain philosophically inclined language but is,
indeed, pretty common in various circumstances where the
“struggle for survival regardless of human traditions, the bru-
tality of war, predation of fellow humans, and sexual desire
become sedimented into antipodal utterances.”
An important outcome of this wide-ranging exploration is
the juxtaposition of premodern and modern (and postmod-
ern) capacities to “address incommensurable worlds—preda-
tion, risk, violence, sacriﬁce, revolution.” In Pillen’s analysis,
this juxtaposition works in favor of the premodern, which
appears to be more at home (more heimlich, antipodally speak-
ing) with incommensurable worlds, with gray zones, with the
blurred boundary between humanity and the world of animals
and enemies, and so on, while “the metalanguage of a modern
linguistic anthropology, the well-oiled paradigms of a literary
criticism of the ironic, and Deleuzian anthropologies” some-
how fall short of this task. One of Pillen’s illustrations of being
inhabited by the enemy, which antipodal utterances involve, is
Varzi’s study of northern Tehran’s youth and their capacity
to live at the crossroads of Chanel scarves and the Islamic re-
public’s images of martyrdom, in a “hyperreality,” character-
ized by “hypervigilance”—the ability to “exist in two or more
spatiotemporal dimensions simultaneously.” Pillen marks as
even more important Varzi’s argument that “modernist ideo-
logical projects and revolutions are unlikely to ﬁnd success in
societies where people have become adept at moving through
such hyperrealities.”56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
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Hegelian dialectic as dissolving into “harmless difference.”
Now, few concepts have proved to be less harmless thanHegel’s
Aufhebung. While it was criticized, downplayed, and recon-
ceptualized in the vein indicated by Pillen’s study, which led
her to dismiss it, there was also the Russian case, where the
Aufhebung was enthusiastically acted out in the Bolshevik Rev-
olution as the epitome of preservation through destruction.
There was, hence, a curious movement in opposite directions,
which became implemented in the reverse translations of
Hegel’s term as an either upward or downward vector. We
might say that the U-turn the Aufhebung took to the west of
Germanywas ironic and to the east revolutionary; in both cases,
however, it became complicit with profound changes (Nikol-
china 2013). We may like it or not, but its formidable and
hardly reassuring potential to articulate violence and revolution
has had its historical heyday and has again resurfaced theo-
retically, as in, for example, Catherine Malabou’s transfor-
mation of the Aufhebung into “plasticity” qua simultaneously
“sculpture” and “explosion” (Malabou 2005).
So here goes my query. Pillen aligns Fabian’s understand-
ing of negativity with the premodern take on antipodal ut-
terances as better suited to provide an adequate perspective
on phenomena like the multidimensional hypervigilance of
Northern Tehran’s youth. As a critique of the not sufﬁciently
watchful descriptive capacities of modern metalanguages and
“well-oiled” paradigms to address sharp communications, she
does make a powerful point. My own observations on the neu-
tralization of contradictory meanings in the post–Cold War
situation could both provide yet another example and beneﬁt
from Pillen’s insights (Nikolchina 2014). The question never-
theless remains whether a sheer awareness of the “cognitive
existence of opposing contexts”would not amount to, precisely,
“harmless difference.” Varzi’s observations on the adeptness
of smooth movement through contradictory realities seem to
imply so. To put it differently, while Hegel’s dialectic, rather
than being harmless, can raise concerns about plasticity qua
explosion, Pillen’s approach to antipodal utterances through
the freezing of undissolved contradiction strikes me as risking
the perpetuation of the handshake with the torturer of which
she tells at the beginning of her study.David Parkin
Emeritus Professor of Social Anthropology, University of Oxford,
Oxford, United Kingdom (david.parkin@anthro.ox.ac.uk). 15 II 17
We are presented with a poignant example of how verbal la-
beling can dehumanize and/or rehumanize. A group violates
an individual who, much later, treats respectfully one of the
original perpetrators. Caught alone and without the savagery
of his group, the perpetrator trembles with fear and/or hu-
miliation. The case reveals the two meanings of the bully as
aggressive (pack wolf) and cowardly (lone wolf ). The formerlyThis content downloaded from 081.096.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aviolent becomes the fearful later, reversing the meaning of his
individuality and of that of the victim. This is the contrastive
concept of human individual both for and against humanity,
yet also inextricably part of it. The argument is thus set, not
within socially dissociated linguistic or grammatical contours,
but within social process. This social process is fundamental to
the semantic shift. It invites us to consider “antipodal” words
as cognitive and emotional responses to social dilemmas and
destruction. The antipodal word is seen not as made up of
docile opposites such as a euphemism but of ﬁercely con-
trasting meanings in sharp tension. The subject matter is not
mundane but is the blood and guts of ambivalent violence,
sexuality, and desire.
The article elaborates on this provocative social determina-
tion and responsiveness. It addresses “utterances that encap-
sulate their opposite and effectuate a U-turn in meaning.” As
far as I understand the argument, this is done by focusing on
three features in this semantic shift: recognizing that opposite
meanings can simultaneously belong within the same word,
that the shift from one meaning to the other involves a com-
municative rupture, but that there is nothing that marks the
actual transition—which is, to that extent, a necessarily un-
marked space “which cannot be ﬁlled,” for it is precisely its
emptiness or nonspeciﬁcity that allows opposite meanings to
be part of the sameword and yet to stand apart from each other.
There is thus a dynamic in antipodal utterances that draws
on several components expressed in ﬁve images: ontological
categories that enable the perception of different kinds of being
to be substituted for each other within the word; polar shifts of
meaning via intermediary meanings; the simultaneous play of
substantives which, like sacriﬁcial objects, are semantically
given as the opposite of each other; seven ambiguities (after
Empson) that together allow for semantic opposites to be ex-
pressed; and, conversely, the postmodern role of irony rather
than substantives to convey semantic opposition.
The ﬁve images are very instructive, but I ﬁnd myself want-
ing to privilege one in particular as being fundamental and the
others as supportive. This is the image of the simultaneity of
opposites, which I wish to return to its pairing with sequen-
tiality, using an example of divination. The simultaneity of
opposites is the semantic matrix that generates the sequential
nature of utterances, in which the oppositions become disen-
tangled and straightened out. Thus, the diviner speaks at ﬁrst
in shockingly contradictory terms, as if hedging her bets on
the outcome of her divination. She eventually settles on a con-
sistent line of explanation and no longer juxtaposes opposite
meanings. She has moved from semantic simultaneity to se-
quentiality. But what is this process and how are the other
images incorporated in it?
The semantic simultaneity can here be thought of as dif-
ferent niches (ontological, substantive, ironic, pronominal, and
so on) into which the diviner speaks, setting up, for example,
animality and humanity as polar opposites. This is not to say
that she is therefore without speaker subjectivity and intention.
It is that, when it is the diviner’s obligatory turn within the56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
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what that something will be beyond the initial cue that she is
given. Her speaker subjectivity is thus a permitted, short-term
expressiveness that is then taken up by the thematic niches
making up the circle of speakers and objects that can be talked
about. This simultaneity of possible talk-paths or niches does
not preclude choosing which of them to pursue. But in incre-
mentally following up on her initial speaking, she can only
choose one at a time.
There is therefore a period of uncertainty between initial
speaking and follow-up speaking. The uncertainty rests on
the ambiguities of the simultaneity of talk-paths, which may
each lead in any number of unanticipated directions. So, initial
utterance (proposition one) leads into second utterance (prop-
osition two) via shared and yet unspeciﬁed semantic territory.
At the core of such semantic resource is the Brenneis concept
of indirection. This suits the speech of the diviner who must
eventually propose a diagnosis and solution to a presented prob-
lem by drawing on such a resource.
Such indirection is effective because it lacks verbal speci-
ﬁcity, being indexically made up of allusion and innuendo.
To be an effective bridge between initial and subsequent pro-
nouncements, it has to remain that way, (i.e., as a space that
cannot be ﬁlled with precise denotata). Its cognitive aspect is
evident in the author’s phrase, “the gap between the beginning
of a step and its completion.” This is like the gap between at
ﬁrst struggling to master something practical (such as riding
a bike) and then knowing it without thinking about it. Strug-
gling ignorance and unconscious competence frame the gap.
The antipodal word is something like “to learn” (i.e., failure
versus success). It is also the mixed-up language of simulta-
neity, in which single words can semantically point in opposite
directions.
In drawing on the incompleteness of irony and “the blank
cheque of paradox,” the ambiguities of antipodal utterances
are potentially endless. The contrast in meaning making up an
antipodal word is only held in place for as long as it reﬂects
social reality (e.g., loyal clansman liable to defect to the enemy
and so contrasted as traitor). But social realities do change (mer-
cenary warfare precludes clanship and so dissolves the contrast
between clan loyalty and treachery). It is then that speakersmay
choose from within the simultaneity of meanings a new se-
quence of, say, cause-effect explanation. This is to suggest a
wider processual perspective on the important concept of an-
tipodal utterances.Reply
I am tempted to start with the most trenchant comment on
the theoretical risk of perpetuating the handshake with a tor-
turer. Prof. Nikolchina evokes undissolved societal contradic-
tion frozen as an antipodal utterance, ceaseless repetition, in theThis content downloaded from 081.096.1
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contradictory worlds here presented as a form of entrapment,
a smoothened reality without grip or obvious rift. The dread
of such a handshake extends itself to this brief exchange, as
she accentuates the deﬁnition of the antipodal as resigned an-
thropology. By contrast, Prof. Nikolchina’s oeuvre and con-
sideration of Hegel’s term Aufhebung offer a route to uncover
the historical potency of a “notorious” antipodal entity. The
verb Aufheben comprises a literal gesture of picking something
up. As a perspectival sign, the word Aufhebung actualizes a
contemplation from below or removal, seen from above as an
elevation. Not just a noun, the Aufhebung was acted out in the
Bolshevik revolution as “the epitome of preservation through
destruction.” This illustrates the vagrancy of a theoretical term
that has a “formidable potential to articulate violence and re-
volution.” A gesture, German linguistic term, and violent act
(Aufheben) coalesce here as a conceptual undercurrent “com-
plicitous with profound changes” to the east of Germany, while
surfacing only as irony to its west. “The Bolshevik revolution
and its later East European editions” are qualiﬁed as “theory
turned into terror” and “the demise of a regime by theory”
(Nikolchina 2013:13, 40). Theory beholden to a remarkably
speculative concept—Aufhebung—intrinsically German and
above all untranslatable. This was “attributed by Hegel to the
proximity between philosophical and everyday language” (Ni-
kolchina 2013:69). This is an allusion to the ﬁeld of linguistic
anthropology, as Prof. Nikolchina opened a distinct door. Had
Derrida moved on to read Brenneis (1986) or Parkin (1982),
his consternation vis-à-vis Hegel’s speculative privilege may
have been easier to ride out. This offers a glimpse of anthro-
pology not as “a series of footnotes,” predetermined by its re-
lation to Hegelian dialectics and philosophy but as an analytical
encompassment of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s speech
community. Hereby, Aufhebung appears less unique; specula-
tive philosophy and indirection are joined at the hip. There goes
Aufhebung’s sense of antipodal linguistic privilege; however,
its cachet is partially restored by the term’s well-documented
legacy and the current afterlife that it is given by Malabou
(2010).
Prof. Parkin places the anthropology of divination at the
center of an understanding of antipodal expression as a so-
cial, interactive process. Images from the work of Viveiros de
Castro, Renou, or Kristeva depend upon large-scale notions
of predation, conquest, or revolution. Prof. Parkin argues that
such images support the argument, while only one is funda-
mental. On the surface, this chosen image concerns divination,
but it serves as an entry point to consult ethnographic reali-
ties and the precise role of antipodal expression in social in-
teraction. A diviner “speaks at ﬁrst in shockingly contradic-
tory terms.” Speaker subjectivity is deﬁned here as “permitted
short-term expressiveness.” Societal conﬁgurations (such as
clan loyalty, treachery, or mercenary warfare) are invoked in
this comment, but the emphasis lies on divination itself. Con-
sequently, the contradictions and conﬂicts of everyday social-
ity are at stake; illnesses, family strife, poverty, or inequality.56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
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antipodal word is only held in place for as long as it reﬂects
social reality.” I would argue that such a processual perspective
only emerges from a longue durée approach to linguistic an-
thropology, spanning decades and generations (e.g., Parkin
2015). The emphasis on divinatory speech opens up a ﬁeld of
enquiry as it represents the diachronic, or a momentary breach
into future sociality. Crucially, Prof. Parkin pushes for closer
scrutiny of the transition from antipodal simultaneity in divi-
nation to sequential discourse—its mechanism—and states
that “at the core of such semantic resource is the Brenneis
concept of indirection.” I propose to refer to “shared territory”
(Brenneis 1986) as the salience of this “period of uncertainty”
and “yet unspeciﬁed semantic territory” is accentuated. Here
such a process encompasses a “language of simultaneity in
which single words can semantically point in opposite direc-
tions.” It is an idea I propose to hold ontowhen turning to other
commentators.
Dr. Empson appears to argue that my argument is built upon
images that should not be compared with one another. A si-
multaneity of the opposing worlds of jaguars and humans, as
in Amerindian shamanism, being “vastly different” from “the
line in between the two” worlds of William Empson’s seventh
type of ambiguity or an antipodal handshake. How to concep-
tualize such an Empsonian line? In relation to Foucault’s notion
of heterotopia and the mirror, an evocative consideration of
such a line emerges. The ﬁne line between two images instan-
tiated by themirror’s visual paradox brings tomind the idea of a
ﬁgure-ground reversal. “The contour between two images or
senses, which is sometimes held in place and sometimes quivers
or shatters.” Dr. Empson asks, “Is a trembling hand the slow
possible manifestation of its opposite?” A ﬁne line of oscillation
between potential identiﬁcations, rather than simultaneity?
Would a ﬁgure-ground reversal be a more suitable determi-
nation of “subtle perceptual processes,”which I depicted simply
as an awareness of another perspective? Concerning a ﬁgure-
ground reversal, Dr. Empson states “because one of the con-
tours of the image is shared with the other, it is difﬁcult to
perceive both images simultaneously.” Our vision ﬂuctuates be-
tween contrasting images. A contour and ﬁne line deﬁned in
this manner bring to mind the “narrow border of experience”
that two incommensurable worlds hold in common (Empson
1930: 218). Dr. Empson goes on to state that “only perhaps”
the Amazonian shaman or postmodern subject can see the two
perspectives simultaneously. And then her crucial question—
“what [. . .] allows for such a moment? Is it the word, the mo-
bilization of a term, or a constellation of other things?”
Foucault’s quoted text lists counter-sites that have the “cu-
rious property [. . .] to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set
of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reﬂect”
(1986:24), “certain colonies” being an extreme type of hetero-
topia, while the ship is heterotopia par excellence (Foucault
1986:27), and the mirror itself being “after all, a utopia since
it is a placeless place” (Foucault 1986:24). In a monograph,
Prof. Nikolchina addressed the “speciﬁc linguistic effect” ofThis content downloaded from 081.096.1
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“heterotopian homonyms are not simply identically sounding
words with this or that different meaning—while ostensibly
identical, they represent, contest and invert each other” (2013:
47). The familiarity of words and messages conceals their in-
version and the contestation that goes together with the mirror
effect. An unacknowledged homonymy might not provoke
dialogic rearticulation and result in an evacuation of meaning:
a desemanticization. Nikolchina discusses this as an unrecog-
nized factor of rhetorical scarcity, “which became apparent
during the messy Yugoslav wars and which migrated to other
conﬂicts, as bloody as they are inarticulate” (2013:54). Nikol-
china’s rendering of Yuri Lotman’s semiosphere develops this
idea: “a celestial body in semiotic space . . . it can explode and
thus open ‘semiotic windows’ toward the non-semiotic, parts of
which it can suck in while casting out its own dead contents
back into the nonsemiotizable” (Nikolchina 2013:65–66). Au-
fhebung as semiotic window toward violence, while some he-
terotopian homonyms linger as “dead content”? The latter
perhaps the spot for a relocation of the grinding point of
Johannes Fabian’s critique of a Hegelian stance? This is how
I propose to reply to Dr. Empson’s query about a “constel-
lation of other things,” only theoretically for now. Her call
for an anthropology of “actual sharpness in action”—invoked
here via theMongolian “White Black TongueMouth”—echoes
Prof. Parkin’s processual approach. In Dr. Empson’s words,
this is the “realization of opposing meanings as they unfurl.”
Dr. Heurich deepens the theoretical dilemma and invokes
a semiotic theory that would be “focused on neither substance
nor subject, neither property nor authorship, and neither se-
quential nor consecutive.” He turns to Maniglier’s tome on
the enigmatic life of signs (2006). Here the value of a word
emerges as it is engaged in its permanent Saussurean exercises,
stretched and negatively deﬁned through differentiation and
opposition, leaving a widemargin of indeterminacy (Maniglier
2006:201, 252, 288, 321, 331). Then, I would add, suddenly
faced with itself: antipodal. An everyday sign, governed by the
principle of indirection but opposing itself, leaves us brow-
beaten into the domain of the virtual. However, Maniglier
argues, “it is not the virtual that turns up to add itself to reality,
as if to surround it by a halo” (Maniglier 2006:196). Reality is
only authenticated as an actualization of the virtual. This is not
using speech to communicate meaning but saying something
to be determined later, to articulate a possibility of something
to be evoked or actualized, and to say something is nothing
else (Maniglier 2006:268). The sign as possibility that “can
never be erased,” as Dr. Heurich states, is thrown into a do-
main of evolving differentiation. It is a semantic space that
remains unplugged. One might wonder whether this is phil-
osophical pageantry, although this is maybe less so for this
journal’s serial reader. Knight and Lewis lay out the reversal
principle as a key feature to explain the evolution of language
(2017). For instance, laughter, an early human signal, is ﬁrst
deployed to display resistance against an external threat. Such
aggressive vocal mobbing sounds threatening and ominous56.128 on November 07, 2017 02:07:14 AM
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000 Current Anthropology Volume 58, Number 6, December 2017when aimed at an outsider, but it is reversed when directed
inward. Within the group, the rhythmic vocalizations are now
relieving and comforting: laughter (Knight and Lewis 2017:
437–438). This compels me to ﬁnally return to the antipodal
handshake envisaged as a ﬁgure-ground reversal—a quivering
ﬁne line, in Dr. Empson’s terms. Considering the heinous acts
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